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1. Introduction 
 
History of comparative law thinking is still partly unwritten. 
There are many important pieces on this issue, but a comprehensive 
account is still lacking.1 Common to all these, narrower or broader, 
                                                                                               
* L’articolo è stato sottoposto, in conformità al regolamento della Rivista a 
double-blind peer review. 
** Author’s note: the preparation of this article was supported by Bolyai-
scholarship provided by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. An earlier and partly 
different version of this paper was published in my Hungarian monograph on the 
history of modern comparative law (Balázs, Fekete, A modern jogösszehasonlítás 
története. Kísérlet a jogösszehasonlítás történetének új értelmezésére (Budapest, 
Gondolat, 2011) 44–72.) 
1 For general accounts of this history see: L.J. Constantinesco, Traité de droit 
comparé I. Introdution au droit compare, Paris, 1972, p. 50 ss.; K. Zweigert and H. 
Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, Oxford, 1998, p. 48 ss.. W. Hug, The 
History of Comparative Law in Harvard Law Review, vol. 45, 1932, p. 1027 ss. For 
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fragments, that they are based on a linear and descriptive approach of 
the development in legal thinking. That is, they consider development 
of comparative law thinking as a linear process that starts from the 
premodern period and lead directly to modernity. This is not too 
surprising, as legal history deeply embraced the concept of linearity 
when discussing both the evolution of a legal institution or an idea or 
school in legal thinking.2 
However, this paper attempts at introducing a new way of 
understanding of the formation of modern comparative law thinking. 
Basically, it borrows certain components of Thomas S. Kuhn’s 
philosophy of science in order to reinterpret the already, more-or-less, 
settled story of modern comparative law thinking. That is, it makes an 
attempt to prepare a more feasible way to understand the 
development of modern comparative law with the help of a historical 
and sociological concept of science as such. A caveat must be made 
here, the reception of Kuhn’s some concept will have a functional 
nature in this study, thus the aim of this paper is not to justify or deny 
the validity or applicability of Kuhn’s ideas – being in the centre of a 
considerable philosophical controversy for decades3 – but to show 
how some Kuhnian concepts may help in providing such a vision on 
the development of modern comparative law that goes beyond the 
simple claims of description and linearity. Personally speaking the 
author of this paper is deeply convinced that the history of a given 
field of scholarly study is much more appealing than a simple, 
chronologically organized list of authors, theses and dates. 
                                                                                              
some national summaries see: M. Ancel, Cent ans de droit comparé en France, in 
Livre centanaire de Société de législation compare, Paris, 1969, p. 3 ss.; M. Rheinstein, 
Comparative and Conflicts of Law in Germany, in The University of Chicago Law 
Review, vol. 2, 1934-35, p. 232 ss.; J.W. Cairns, The Development of Comparative 
Law in Great Britain, in M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law, Oxford, 2006, p. 131 ss. 
2 As a classic example: Sir F. Pollock and F.W. Maitland, The History of 
English Law. Vol 1-2, Cambridge, 1968. From the contemporary literature: S. 
Hähnchen, Rechtsgeschichte. Von der Römischen Antike bis zur Neuzeit, Heidelberg, 
2012. 
3 For a summary: A. Bird, Thomas Kuhn, in E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/thomas-kuhn  
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From the perspective of this paper the following Kuhnian terms 
have certain relevance: pre-paradigm period,4 scientific community,5 
paradigm, 6  and symbolical generalizations. 7  These all have some 
added value in the discussion of the story of modern comparative law, 
and the application of them may even help to overcome some widely 
shared commonplaces as for instance the lack of proper scholarly 
premises or the underdeveloped nature of methodological reflection.8 
In sum, this paper argues that with the help of some Kuhnian 
terms a better view on the formation of modern comparative law may 
be reached. The main thesis is that paradigms can be identified9 in this 
almost 150 years story and this point will be illustrated by the detailed 
discussion of the first paradigm of modern comparative law: the 
historical and comparative jurisprudence. Although this paradigm was 
                                                                                               
4 Cf. T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, 1970, p. 10–
22 (explaining that the formation of the first paradigm in a given field of study, that 
is emergence of “normal science” is preceded by a longer period in which various 
schools and their diverse interpretation compete with each other. This is the so-
called “pre-paradigm period”). 
5  Cf. ibid. p. 23–51 and p. 177–179. (A central component of Kuhn’s 
philosophy, as he argues that the commitment to a paradigm’s premises establishes a 
scientific community, therefore, the ‘normal science’ is simply impossible without 
the communities of scientists, too). 
6 Cf. ibid. p. 181–187. (In the 1969 Postscript, Kuhn refines his concept of 
paradigm. It is argued, that paradigms are “constellation of group commitments” in 
various issues being crucial in research work. In essence, these commitments are 
composed of symbolic generalizations, beliefs in particular models, values and 
exemplars). 
7  Cf. ibid. p. 182–184. (From the aspect of legal scholarship, symbolic 
generalizations may have a crucial role, as the theses of jurisprudence are mostly 
expressed in this form. Legal studies tend to use an abstract language, and the 
sharing of some statements and theses are vital if one wants to subscribe to a certain 
stream of legal thinking such as natural law understanding or legal sociology, for 
instance). 
8 For a contemporary summary of this criticism see P. Legrand, How to 
Compare Now, in Legal Studies, vol. 16, 1996, p. 232 ss. 
9 Whether the concept of paradigm is to be applied to social or human 
sciences is still an unsettled question. However, even Kuhn argues that it is not 
impossible ab ovo as puzzle-solving scholarly activities are also part of human 
sciences. See T.S. Kuhn, The Natural and the Human Sciences, in Id., The Road since 
Structures. Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, Chicago-London, 2000, p. 216 ss. 
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overcome in the first ten years of the 20th century mostly due to the 
efforts of the 1900 Parisian Congress, 10  it offers an excellent 
opportunity to test Kuhn’s concepts against facts of the history of 
legal thinking. Naturally, in this sense, this work is unfinished yet, as 
the consecutive paradigms and the paradigm-shifts in between must 
also be studied in the future. But, all in all, this fragment may pave the 
way toward a novel understanding and may also provoke a stimulating 
discussion. 
 
 
2. General background: the rise of positivism and the idea of 
evolution 
 
The continental European legal scholarship, that emerged based 
on the ius commune stemming from the wide reception of Roman law, 
seemed to be irreversibly disintegrating by the end of the 18th century 
along national borders. This process was due to the emergence of 
modern states and their efforts to centralize the formerly multifaceted 
legal orders.11 Therefore, from the beginning of the 19th century, one 
cannot refer to a uniform European legal scholarship any more, but 
instead its national counterparts focusing on the analysis and 
development of the national legal orders became the players of the 
European legal world. The attention of legal scholars almost entirely 
was directed towards their own legal systems, except for a few isolated 
attempts, 12  and the outlook to foreign laws lost its significance. 
However, following the first third of the 19th century, the European 
scholarly thinking was affected by fundamentally new impacts, which, 
by the middle of the century, have led to a substantial transformation 
of the era’s perception of scholarship dealing with social issues. This 
change, obviously, did not leave the previously national legal 
tradition-focused thinking of lawyers unaffected either. 
These impacts are to be divided into two large groups. On the 
one hand, the general methodological transformation of the period’s 
                                                                                               
10 For an overview of the Congress see: Congrés international de droit comparé. 
Tenu á Paris du 31 Juillet au 4 aout 1900. Procés-verbaux et documents, Paris, 1905. 
11 Cf. M. Weber, Staatssoziologie, Berlin, 1956. 
12 Cf. M. Ancel, op. cit., p. 4; or M. Rheinstein, op. cit., p. 232–233. 
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scientific thinking has to be pointed out, on the other, the theory of 
evolution, which has had a great influence by the second half of the 
century, need to be mentioned. This general methodological 
transformation of scientific thinking and the wide penetration of the 
idea of evolution had such a huge impact on the general thinking and 
theoretical-intellectual atmosphere of the period that it had not left 
legal scholarship unaffected either.  
By working out the theses of scientific positivism, Auguste 
Comte has decisively contributed to the formation of modern scientific 
thinking. Inspired by the buoyant development of natural sciences in 
this period, Comte argued that social phenomena can be studied with 
the help of methods of natural sciences. Thus the laws having an 
objective character that affects social phenomena can be 
reconstructed, and the laws of the world of physics offer proper 
examples for such endeavors. So, in Comte’s eyes, research focusing 
on social phenomena should always be based on facts and not a priori 
principles.13 These insights show that Come’s ideal was the research of 
social phenomena by a precision that can be compared to that of 
natural sciences, and the simple fact that he called the analysis and 
discussion of social phenomena social physics, also reveals a lot about 
his thinking. In sum, due to the appearance of Comte’s positivism 
focusing on the method of induction, the application of methods 
rooted in natural sciences gained momentum in scholarship discussing 
various socio-historical phenomena.  
In addition, by the first third of the century the comparative 
method has spread in a wider circle in natural sciences, among which 
the first such area was comparative anatomy, as it is argued by Marc 
Ancel. This spreading did not leave other areas of study unaffected 
either, mainly given that the inductive method required by positivist 
philosophy has created a favorable context for the wider application 
of the comparative method. The earliest attempts to do so appeared 
first in linguistics, literature and history of religion, so using 
                                                                                               
13 For a details see: A. Comte, Discours sur l’espirit positif, Paris, 1844. For an 
analytical discussion and criticism: F.A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science: 
Studies on the Abuse of Reason, Indianapolis, 1979, p. 253–255. 
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comparison when analysing socio-historical phenomena became 
acceptable for more and more scholars.14 
In the development of the idea of historical evolution, Hegel’s 
philosophical system was of crucial importance. According to Hegel, 
history is not only a blind evolution, but a process based on certain 
principles that can be identified by philosophers. With the help of 
dialectics stemming from the triad of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, one 
may create a connection between the different steps of history, and it 
can help in identifying the idea which determines history.15 That is, 
there is always an idea that comes to life in history, and the step-by-
step manifestation of this process is history itself. This approach 
paved way to the step-by-step, development-oriented perception of 
legal development in legal scholarship, hence creating the possibility 
of reconstructing the general evolutionary lines of legal development.16 
Hegel’s doctrines mostly stimulated the continental academic 
thinking, while in the Anglo-Saxon world Darwin’s theory of 
evolution had a serious impact. The thought of Darwinian evolution 
made the application of the historical method accepted generally, by 
influencing the attitude of those 19th century authors, who were 
dissatisfied with the premises of the utilitarian-rationalist conceptual 
legal thinking dominant in the 18th century.17 The idea of evolution 
could perfectly be used in establishing a legal scholarship with more 
historical character, thus it gave more room to historic uniqueness 
opposed to the generality of rationalism.  
                                                                                               
14 In 1805, Cuvier’s writing Traité d’anatomie comparée was published. In 
1821, Raynouard’s handbook Grammaire comparé des langues de l’Europe latin was 
published, and later writings in the area of comparative literature also became more 
and more widespread. See for example M. Ancel, op. cit., p. 4. 
15 For more details see: G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, Kitchener, 
2001. For an analytical discussion and criticism: F.A. Hayek, op. cit., p. 385–387. 
16 See E. von Caemmerer and K. Zweigert, Évolution et état actuel de la 
méthode du droit comparé en Allemagne, in Livre centanaire de Société de législation 
compare, Paris, 1969, p. 269–270. 
17 See Sir F. Pollock, History of Comparative Jurisprudence, in Journal of the 
Society of Comparative Jurisprudence, vol. 5, 1903, p. 79 ss. and Id., English 
Opportunities in Historic and Comparative Jurisprudence, in Sir F. Pollock, Oxford 
Lectures and Other Discourses, London-New York, 1890, p. 42 ss. 
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All in all, it can be argued, that the spread of the idea of 
scientific positivism and the theory of evolution have largely 
contributed to the birth of the first paradigm of modern comparative 
law in Kuhnian terms. Scientific positivism and the theory of 
evolution, which are intertwined in many aspects,18 endorsed such 
methodological principles and philosophical aims that had a vital 
relevance for the rising historical and comparative jurisprudence. 
Basically, by merging the idea of evolution with the need for 
comparison, the structural frame providing the bases for a paradigm 
was created.  
It also needs to be highlighted that the solidification and inner 
coherence of the theoretical frames alone would not have been 
sufficient for the development of the first paradigm of comparative 
law, if it had not been connected to the first wave of 
institutionalization. It comes logically from Kuhn’s concept of 
paradigm that we cannot infer the existence of paradigms without 
institutional networks. Only the academic institutions are capable of 
providing such a material and intellectual structure which can support 
the regular practice of scholarship. If the institutional framework is 
missing, then scientists are not capable of sharing their results with 
each other and the wider audience, so the “normal science”, as coined 
by Kuhn, cannot take shape.  
Mark Ancel argues that the year 1869 was crucial in the process 
of institutionalization of modern comparative law, most probably 
because of a historical coincidence. This was the year when Henry 
Sumner Maine founded his Historical and Comparative Jurisprudence 
department in Oxford; when the Société de législation comparée, 
which later had a serious effect on the development of comparative 
law, was established in Paris; and when the journal Revue de droit 
international et de legislation comparée was started in Belgium.19 In 
1872, the previously mentioned French society has launched its own 
journal (Bulletin Trimestriel de la Société de Legislation Comparée), 
which was followed by the German Zeitschrift für vergleichende 
                                                                                               
18 Hayek specifically raises awareness and thoroughly analyses the fact that 
the seemingly distant theories of Comte and Hegel are very much connected in their 
presumptions. See in detail F.A. Hayek, op. cit., p. 367 ss.  
19 M. Ancel, op. cit., p. 6.  
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Rechtswissenschaft also dealing with legal problems in a comparative 
perspective in 1878.20 The first professional society of the German 
language region was founded in 1894, called Gesellschaft für 
vergleichende Rechts- und Staatwichensaft. In 1894, more scholarly 
societies were formed both in Germany and England, the 
Internationale Vereinigung für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft und 
Volkwirtschaftlehre 21  and the Society of Comparative Legislation. 22 
These societies and the network of their journals, combined with the 
university faculties have already provided a sufficient background for 
scholarly research built upon the regular communication of authors 
interested, thus it led to the formation of a scientific community 
devoted to a comparative study of law.23 
In the following, this paradigm will be discussed by presenting 
its two main streams: the English and the German schools of historical 
and evolutionary comparative law thinking. The differentiation 
between these two schools is justified owing to the linguistic and 
cultural similarities, however, it should also bear in mind that a vast 
number of common presumptions connects them, too. 
 
 
3. Historical and Comparative Jurisprudence – the emergence of 
the paradigm in England 
 
3.1 The fusion of the historical and comparative methods in 
Maine’s Ancient Law 
 
It is no exaggeration to argue that Sir Henry Sumner Maine’s 
work is among the turning points of the 19th century English 
                                                                                               
20 I Zajtai, Réflexions sur l’évoltuion de droit compare, in H. Bernstein - U 
Drobnig - H Kötz (eds.), Fetschrift für Konrad Zweigert, Tübingen, 1981, p. 596. 
21 See M. Rheinstein, op. cit., p. 234, footnote 8. For details see H. Wehberg, 
Internationale Vereinigung für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft und 
Volkwirtschaftslehre, in Introduction á l’étude du droit comparé. Recueil d’Études en 
l’honneur d’Édouard Lambert, Paris, 1938, p. 664 ss. 
22 See Z. Péteri, A jogösszehasonlítás kezdetei az angol jogtudományban, in 
Állam- és Jogtudomány, vol. 18, 1975, p. 409, footnote 57. 
23 About institutionalisation see in detail L.J. Constantinesco, op. cit., p. 103–
107. 
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jurisprudence. Maine deliberately broke up with the previously 
dominant analytical approach – coined by Austin and Bentham and 
based on a racionalist epistemology – and turned against the approach 
of 18th century authors who have neglected historicism manifestly.24 
In his opus magnum, Ancient Law, published in 1861 and soon 
became popular all over the continent, Maine attempted to discover 
the general laws of legal development through examining the history 
of the various institutions of law. One may consider his efforts was 
pathbreaking, as he tried to understand analyze the phenomenon of 
law within the conditions of the given historical era, including the 
social, economic and ideological context. Thereby Maine stepped 
away from the utilitarian-analytical thinking putting legal principles in 
the center of study and applying the tools of logic for legal 
phenomena without any interest in their context.25 
Maine’s view on legal scholarship, a novelty in his era, was 
formed as a result of several impacts. First of all, the impact of natural 
science methods should be mentioned, as these methods advocated 
that the discovery of objective, empirically-founded laws of nature is 
certainly possible. Maine, in accordance with the period’s incline 
towards positivism, firmly believed that one can find such laws both in 
human nature and society as well,26 and, as a consequence, legal 
history also has its own evolutionary laws. Thus, he wanted to make 
legal scholarship a real science in terms of the era, so he put the 
inductive method in spotlight instead of the previously dominant 
deductive and speculative approaches. For him, geology was the 
influencing model, which in the question of geomorphology praised 
the idea of continuous and almost undetectable change, as opposed to 
those former concepts which regarded sudden and vast catastrophes 
                                                                                               
24 About Maine’s career in detail see G. Hamza, Sir Henry Maine et le droit 
comparé, in Acta Antiqua, vol. 45, 2005, p. 193 ss.; Z. Péteri, A jogösszehasonlítás 
kezdetei az angol jogtudományban, cit., p. 399. 
25 For the comprehensive critique of the utilitarian-analytical thinking see J 
Bryce, The Methods of Legal Science, in J. Bryce, Studies in History and 
Jurisprudence, vol. II, Oxford, 1901, p. 178 ss. 
26 Sir P. Vinogradoff, The Teaching of Sir Henry Sumner Maine, in The 
Collective Papers of Paul Vinogradoff I, New York, 1995, p. 182 ss. 
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as the reasons of geological changes.27 It is apparent that this idea was 
the main source of Maine’s views on the organic legal development, 
and he built up his theory based on this analogy about the levels of the 
development of law.  
Besides Maine’s natural sciences-influenced thinking based on 
external laws, he also drew ideas from the theses of the German 
historical school of jurisprudence. This understanding, which 
promoted the historical and collective psychological character of law 
due to its conservativism and romanticism, has clearly influenced 
Maine’s work, especially in relation to the application of the historical 
method.28 Both Maine and the historical school of jurisprudence have 
shared the view that there are some distinct nations (superior or 
progressive ones) whose legal development has its own unique path. 
Moreover, Maine also agreed with the scholars of the historical school 
that Roman law is the most important starting point of any legal 
research. 29  However, Maine has outstepped this framework, as 
represented by Savigny, as he expanded his research to the English, 
Greek and Hindi law (besides Roman law).30 Further, he did not 
consider the national characteristics defining the legal development to 
be definite and unchangeable.31 To sum up, Maine incorporated the 
insights of the historical school to his theory but without its strictly 
national, that is to say German, angle. This may be one of the reasons 
behind the popularity of his theses abroad. 
Another important element of Maine’s scholarly attitude was his 
constant ‘fight’ against abstract and a priori theses. He did agree 
neither with contractual theories endorsing the idea of natural state, 
nor with a priori constructions of natural law, because he thought that 
they all are founded on false assumptions. Among other things, they 
did not take into consideration the organic nature of social 
development and the picture of the so-called primitive human can also 
be considered fundamentally wrong. Besides these skeptical views, 
Maine also heavily criticized the attitude of Bentham and Austin: first 
                                                                                               
27 P. Stein, Legal evolution, Cambridge, 1988, p. 88. 
28 P. Vinogradoff, The Teaching of Sir Henry Sumner Maine, cit., p. 180. 
29 P. Stein, op. cit., p. 90. 
30 Ibid, p. 92. 
31 P. Vinogradoff, The Teaching of Sir Henry Sumner Maine, cit., p. 180. 
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of all, he doubted the feasibility of utilitarianism, secondly he 
considered Austin’s concept of law, focusing on the central role of 
sovereign, to lack any connection to history.32  
These all shaped Maine’s understanding of his historical and 
comparative method, by which he aimed to present the questions of 
legal development in a fundamentally new context, in his book, 
Ancient Law. The starting point of his theory was the differentiation 
between stationary and progressive societies.33 He apparently needed 
this differentiation in order to avoid the mistakes stemming from the 
universalisation of the uniqueness of Western European social- and 
legal development, which was especially striking compared to the 
societies living in the colonies of the era, such as India and China. 
Thus, Maine did not want to declare the laws of development 
determining Western legal development to be generally valid, as it was 
easily imaginable that a society outside Europe, due to the 
underdeveloped nature of social relations, was unable to fulfill the 
Western path. Based on the previous differentiation, and through 
analyzing the history of some legal institutions – fiction, equity and 
legislation – which harmonize legal development with social 
development, Maine came to the conclusion that developing societies 
necessary move through the disintegration of traditional ties aims 
towards the development of individual relations determining the 
modern era. According to Maine, this process can be grasped, in legal 
terms, in the evolution from status to contract.34 
With the help of this theory ‘legal of evolution’ a historical 
classification of legal systems also takes form. Based on the previous 
presumptions, an evolutionist way of legal development is to be 
reconstructed: cohabitation without provisions with a legal character35 
is followed by a state of society which is regulated by prompt 
individual decisions based on divine inspiration (so called themistes),36 
                                                                                               
32 Ibid., p. 176–178. 
33 Sir H.S. Maine, Ancient Law. Its Connection with the Early History of 
Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas, London, 1908, p. 21. 
34 Ibid., p. 151. 
35 Ibid, p. 110. 
36 Ibid., p. 3–6. 
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then customary law evolves built on oligarchic bases,37 finally these 
customs are enacted in law, the rea of ancient codes.38 This line of 
development was called the spontaneous development of law by 
Maine, which occurs in all human communities. However, the 
differentiation between developing and stagnating societies gets a real 
meaning at this point, as further development from fiction, equity and 
legislation to contract is only a privilege for advancing or developing 
societies. It is evident that the previously described path of 
development provides an opportunity to place the legal systems of 
different periods and societies onto the different levels of legal 
development, thus it incorporates the possibility of the historical and 
development-based classification of legal systems, too. 
Ancient law has brought a reverberating success to its author, 
and a part of the theses elaborated in the book, such as the strict 
formalism of ancient law, the connection between law and religion in 
the practice of ancient societies, or the role of procedural law in in the 
earliest legal systems,39 soon became the core concepts of legal history 
and spread quickly. Obviously this success and widespread reception 
can be owed to the fact that Maine’s views could easily be fit into the 
public thinking, which already dealt intensively with the notion of 
scientism and the idea of biological evolution.40 
To sum up, Maine’s work had opened new prospects in English 
jurisprudence, and created a school in the meantime. In the following 
decades, this school, with Oxford as its center, has continued the 
elaboration of some problems and the further development of the 
research method, inspired by the ‘master’. 
 
3.2. The development of historical and comparative jurisprudence 
 
Sir Frederick Pollock, who took charge of Maine’s department 
in 1883 and led it for 20 years, was a pioneer in improving Maine’s 
                                                                                               
37 Ibid., p. 8–12. 
38 Ibid., p. 12–18. 
39 For the listing of Maine’s theses known as ’scientific commonplaces’ see P. 
Stein, op. cit., p. 98. 
40 Ibid., p. 99-100. 
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findings. Besides his wide-ranging work on common law,41 Pollock 
prepared the notes of Maine’s major writings, moreover, he also 
studied extensively the methodological problems and historical 
antecedents of comparative law in detail.42 
Historical and comparative jurisprudence relies on the same 
historical method which has previously been applied in natural- and 
social sciences, in Pollock’s eyes. To put it in a wider context, 
according to him, the historical method comes from Darwin’s theory 
of evolution, which Pollock understands as the historical, more 
precisely, historical-evolutionary interpretation of natural facts. 
Therefore, it can logically be argued that the use of the historical 
method, in reality, means the application of the theory of evolution, 
through which the development of human societies can be explained 
satisfactorily.43 
The most significant forerunners of applying the historical 
method in social sciences were Vico, Montesquieu, Burke and 
Savigny, but it was the “master”, Maine, who improved and refined 
the use of this method in the area of jurisprudence. The historical 
method itself for Pollock became the newest and most important tool 
of natural- and social sciences. The advantage of this method is its 
inductive nature, or its facts-focused nature, which protects the 
researcher from the exaggerated, sometimes even surreal “flow” of the 
rational-deductive thinking. However, its deficiencies also come from 
the inductive nature, as the method is not able to provide answers to 
the final, abstract problems of philosophy. Due to these immanent 
barriers, the historical method can highlight where the competence of 
science ends and where the role of philosophy begins, and it can also 
show the point, where competent philosophical questions can be 
                                                                                               
41 Among others, Pollock dealt with the question of contracts and torts, the 
development of common law and participated in writing Maitland’s comprehensive 
piece, History of English Law. See W.S. Holdsworth, The Historians of Anglo-
American Law, New York, 1928, p. 94–98.  
42 See F. Pollock, History of Comparative Jurisprudence, cit.; F. Pollock, 
English Opportunities, cit.; or Sir F. Pollock, Droit comparé: prolégoménes de son 
histoire, in Congrés international de droit comparé. Tenu á Paris du 31 Juillet au 4 
aout 1900. Procés-verbaux et documents, Paris, 1905, p. 258 ss. 
43 F. Pollock, English Opportunities, cit., p. 41. 
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asked.44 Thus, the historical method, based on the idea of evolution, 
can accurately define the borders separating science and philosophy, 
consequently, it defines the place of historical and comparative 
jurisprudence in the world of scholarship. 
Furthermore, the results of Pollock’s methodological research 
revealed that a strict separation of the historical and comparative 
methods was simply impossible, so legal scholarship has to be 
historical and comparative at the same time. Pollock based this 
conclusion on a quote from Maine and his opening remarks at the 
Village Communities.45 Through emphasizing the inseparable nature 
of the historical and comparative methods, Pollock in reality has 
declared the most basic and most believed basic principle of the first 
paradigm of modern comparative law. The universality of his 
statement is further proven by the fact that through referring to the 
work of Joseph Kohler,46 Pollock states that from his perspective, it 
does not even matter whether one call this field of study historical and 
comparative jurisprudence or universal legal history (Universale 
Rechtsgeschichte or Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft).47 
Regarding specific research tasks and opportunities, Pollock 
thought that comparative jurisprudence had a huge potential for 
study: for instance, the historical analysis of English legal institutions 
and their comparison with Roman law, or examining certain Indian 
rights. Besides theoretical aims, researching Indian law had practical 
interests as well, as getting to know the Indian law is in the vital 
interest of the public administration of the British Empire. In his 
arguments Pollock explained that he did not believe that India could 
be governed only through the rule of weapons, but in order to build 
                                                                                               
44 Pollock’s word on this: “It is a key to unlock ancient riddles, a solvent of 
apparent contradictions, and potent spell to exercise those phantoms of 
superstition, sheeted now in the garb of religion, now humanity, now (such is their 
audacity) of the free spirit of science itself, that do yet squeak and gibber in our 
streets. It is like the magic sword in Mr. George Meredith’s delightful tale, whose 
power was to sever thoughts”; ibid., p. 42. 
45 F. Pollock, History of Comparative Jurisprudence, cit. p. 75. For a detailed 
analysis Z. Péteri, A jogösszehasonlítás kezdetei az angol jogtudományban, cit., p. 404. 
46 Several versions exist when it comes to spelling Joseph Kohler’s name. This 
study uses the version of the German National Library. 
47 F. Pollock, History of Comparative Jurisprudence, cit. p. 76. 
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up the well-functioning public administration, knowing Indian rights 
was a must.48 
The questions of methodology were also studied by Pollock’s 
close friend, James Bryce, usually dealing with political and public law 
issues, and who also shared the assumption about the unity of the 
historical and comparative methods. In his polemic piece about the 
methods of jurisprudence, which was also quite critical with Bentham 
and Austin, Bryce argued that the comparative method as understood 
by Pollock was no more than another “face” of the historical method. 
With the help of the comparative method, the most important and 
general characteristics can be filtered from the legal historical facts 
collected through the historical method, so well-founded theoretical 
conclusions can be drawn this way.49 Jurisprudence can be imagined 
neither without the historical nor without the comparative methods, 
which complement and mutually help each other. 
Sir Paul Vinogradoff, who emigrated from Russia, is to be 
considered the last representative of English historical and 
comparative jurisprudence. His work largely contributed to further 
developing the theoretical assumptions of the Oxford school, due to 
the fact that he incorporated the results of the period’s German social 
sciences, mainly Max Weber’s points. His main work, which was 
planned to be his legacy of six volumes but remained unfinished due 
to his death, became the most compelling attempt to provide a 
summary and organized explanation for historical and comparative 
jurisprudence, that is, for this paradigm. 
Vinogradoff succeeded Pollock as head of the Historical and 
Comparative Jurisprudence Department in 1904, and in his inaugural 
lecture, besides praising Maine’s work, he presented the theses of 
comparative jurisprudence. This was especially important because it 
made available an organized summary of those research principles, 
which have already silently and many times intuitively driven the 
works of his predecessors. He distinguished four fundamental 
principles: (i) studying law cannot only happen in order to transfer 
professional knowledge, but law can also be a subject of scientific 
                                                                                               
48 See in detail F. Pollock, English Opportunities, cit. p. 43 ss. 
49 J. Bryce, The Methods of Legal Science, cit., p. 154–155. 
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examination, (ii) two distinct methods can be applied in legal 
research: the deductive and inductive methods, (iii) in inductive 
research, law appears as a historical phenomenon (iv) if research aims 
at discovering general laws, then the historical method should also be 
comparative.50 With the help of these four propositions, Vinogradoff 
organized the structural principles of the first paradigm of 
comparative jurisprudence into a logical system, thus largely 
contributing to the clarification of a previously fragmented and 
intuitive methodology. 
Another important methodological observation from 
Vinogradoff was the distinction between the analytical and synthetic 
study of law. This clarification is important because the antithesis of 
the analytical method was usually seen in the historical method. 
Vinogradoff considered this as a logical mistake and argued that the 
antithesis of the analytical method was not the historical but the 
synthetic method.51 In addition, the purpose of the synthetic method, 
as opposed to the analytical method solely focusing on law and legal 
provisions, was to examine the historical, social, economic and other 
factors influencing the development of law, and understanding law as 
a historical phenomenon in general. History can get a crucial role in 
this process, but other sources, such as statistical data – if available – 
can also be added to the research.  
One of the most important benefits of the synthetic method is 
that it protects the researcher, enchanted by a “conceptual heaven”, 
from drifting too much apart from social reality; moreover it prevents 
them from disregarding some factors, in the name of conceptual 
clarity and logic, without whom the functioning of law is 
incomprehensible. 52  However, it should be emphasized that 
Vinogradoff, as opposed to the often angular, categorical, or 
sometimes even ironic opinions of his predecessors, did not discard 
the analytical method, but instead he recognized its relevance in 
conceptual legal thinking. He argued that the different national legal 
provisions call the attention to the necessity of analytical method. 
                                                                                               
50 P. Vinogradoff, The Teaching of Sir Henry Sumner Maine, cit. p. 188–189. 
51 Sir P. Vinogradoff, Methods of Jurisprudence, in Id., Custom and Right, 
New Jersey, 2000, p. 4. 
52 Ibid., p. 7–8. 
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Furthermore, the comparative research of different national solutions 
opens the way to the synthetic research method, which searches for 
the causes of the difference between legal institutions in their 
context.53 Thus, analytical research is an inherent step of legal study, 
but it can never get exclusive if one aims to find a general and 
comprehensive explanation. 
In his main work,54 Vinogradoff aimed to find the theoretical 
explanation to European legal development, starting from the work of 
his predecessors. In this late writing, he tried to provide a 
comprehensive, encyclopedic summary of historical and comparative 
jurisprudence, as a complementary to his predecessors’ and fellow 
researchers’ work. The base of his views on legal development was 
formed by the differentiation of the historical types of legal 
development. In determining the historical types of law, Vinogradoff 
was inspired by the results of the early German economic-sociology, 
for example, in many writings he has mentioned the impacts of the 
theories of Max Weber and Karl Bücher.55 These historical types of 
the development of law were understood by Vinogradoff, similarly to 
the previously mentioned scholars, as ideal types, so he did not aim to 
consider them as exclusive patterns. 
As for legal development based on historical types, Vinogradoff 
analyzed in detail the roots and theoretical problems of this approach. 
He reached back to Aristotle and Montesquieu in relation to the 
research based on ideal types, but he also argued that their attempts at 
classification had lost their validity by then, because they have always 
started from the state when explaining law. However, law was not 
connected to the state in all historical periods, as this was already 
proven by Maine. This is why a new and valid attempt to create 
historical ideal types, in line with the requirements of the synthetic 
method, should be based on social arrangements. Vinogradoff agreed 
that law was closely tied to values, and he considered this feature as an 
important factor in creating the types, but he rejected both the 
“idealistic monism” of Hegel and the “economic monism” of Marx. 
                                                                                               
53 Ibid., p. 10–11. 
54 Sir P. Vinogradoff, Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence I-II, London, 1920-
22. 
55 Ibid., p. 156.  
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These approaches did not fit in the synthetic method, as they were 
exclusive by putting only one factor of development in the center of 
their argumentation. Further mistakes of Hegelian and Marxist 
theories are that in some cases they confuse fact with idea and effect 
with cause, as it is pointed out by Vinogradoff.56 
Vinogradoff considered his method ideological, as he argued 
that the task of historical jurisprudence was monitoring the path of 
the everchanging legal ideas with the help of the facts of legal history. 
He used the expression “ideological” primarily to emphasize the 
distance between his understanding of legal development and the 
chronological method. This task is facilitated by the fact that in 
human evolution some ideal developmental lines can be discovered.57 
He differentiated between six historical types of law: (i) the law 
of totemistic societies, (ii) tribal law, (iii) the law of city-states, (iv) 
medieval law, (v) the law of individualism and (vi) the law of 
collectivism. It has to be emphasized, at the very beginning, that this 
classification has no universal character as it is only relevant to the 
European development of law. On the other hand, this grouping does 
not require a chronological order, already referred to in relation to the 
ideological method, as some components of these settings may appear 
in different periods as well.58 
It is apparent that Vinogradoff, similarly to Kohler, does not 
derive his arguments from the most radical version of evolutionism, 
according to which all human societies necessarily have to go through 
the same developmental stages, but he believes in a more “relativist” 
version of the idea. This more “relativist” understanding accepts the 
existence of unique phenomena and developmental lines in some ways 
different than others, in the process of general legal development 
determined by universal laws.  
Vinogradoff’s work is essential from many angles. His 
methodological efforts largely contributed to the systematization and 
clarification of the methodology of historical and comparative 
jurisprudence. This means that he basically managed to systematize 
                                                                                               
56 See in detail Sir P. Vinogradoff, Historical Types of International Law, in 
The Collected Papers of Paul Vinogradoff II, New York, 1995, p. 248 ss. 
57 Ibid., p. 245. 
58 Ibid.  
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the theses of the paradigm in an explicit way. Another important 
aspect of his legacy is that in his main work, which was supposed to 
be a six-volume book series, he attempted, through the synthetization 
of the results of his predecessors, to prepare a systematic discussion of 
a universal historical and comparative jurisprudence. However, his 
death did not make possible the completion of this ambitious venture. 
It can be noted however, that his work, which was very sophisticated 
both theoretically and historically, due to the spreading of new ideas 
on legal comparison as elaborated by French authors, such as 
Lambert or Saleilles, 59  remained more-or-less unknown in the 
Western literature of comparative law. This is why Vinogradoff is 
remembered today mainly as a legal historian by the academia. 
 
 
4. From Ethnologische Jurisprudenz to Vergleichende 
Rechtswissenschaft – the birth of the paradigm in Germany 
 
4.1. The beginning: ethnological perspectives in the legal 
scholarship 
 
In the 19th century, the German legal thinking, in harmony with 
the general European scholarly atmosphere, was dominantly devoted 
the dogmatic-positivist understanding of law. German lawyers have 
accepted the boundaries of their national legal system as given, and 
focused on its “internal” problems.60 Their efforts have reached their 
peak in the pre-war decades, at the same time when the BGB was 
enacted and came into effect. However, besides all this, some authors 
still needed a “broader perspective”,61 and this need, propelled by the 
rise of empirical and evolutionist methods in general scholarly 
                                                                                               
59 Cf. E. Lambert, Conception générale et définition de la science du droit 
comparé, sa méthode, son histoire:; le droit comparé et l’enseignement du droit, in 
Congrés international de droit comparé. Tenu á Paris du 31 Juillet au 4 aout 1900. 
Procés-verbaux et documents, Paris, 1905, p. 26 ss. or R. Saleilles, Conception et objet 
de la science du droit compare, in Congrés international de droit comparé. Tenu á Paris 
du 31 Juillet au 4 aout 1900. Procés-verbaux et documents, Paris, 1905, p. 167 ss. 
60 See in detail M. Rheinstein, op. cit., p. 232–238. 
61 Ibid., p. 233. 
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thinking, has led to the start of comparative legal studies and the 
formation of an academic community in the last three decades of the 
century. 
These initiatives, which stretched beyond the dogmatic-positivist 
horizon of this period, started with a volume published in the 
beginning of the 60s. In 1861, Bachofen’s book about matriarchal 
legal systems was published, which, contrary to the dominant 
dogmatic trends, did not concentrate only on Roman law as did the 
influential “Romanists” of the historical school of law, but also 
integrated the study of “other” legal systems, too.62 
The first comprehensive discussion of the research goals and 
methodology of the new approach was submitted by Albert Hermann 
Post, lawyer and judge from Bremen.63  The titles of Post’s first 
writings64 show the aim of their author to renew the methodology and 
scholarly nature of jurisprudence, starting from the new impetus 
provided by the fast development of natural sciences. This need for 
renewal was propelled by Post’s methodological dissatisfaction with 
the legal thinking of his era: he considered the theses of both the 
natural law school and the historical school of law simply 
unsupportable. From his perspective, a major shortcoming of the 
school of natural law was that scholars of this approach, in general, 
did not pay enough attention to studying the legal life of the different 
people of the world, so they did not have a strong intent to discover 
                                                                                               
62 J.J. Bachofen, Das Mutterrecht: eine Untersuchung über die Gynaikokratie 
der alten Welt nach ihrer religiöses und rechtlichen Natur, Stuttgart, 1861. Gábor 
Hamza considers this writing the starting point of the school based on Kohler and 
Bernhöft cf G. Hamza, op. cit., p. 201–203. 
63 R. Schott, Main Trends in German Ethnological Jurisprudence and Legal 
Ethnology, in Journal of Legal Pluralism, vol. 14, 1982, p. 38 ss. It is interesting to 
note here that the first attempt to do empirical research on the legal life of tribes 
living on German colonies is also connected to Post. In 1893, Post developed a 
comprehensive questionnaire, which provided help in examining the legal systems of 
the tribal civilisations of the German colonies in Africa. See in detail A. Lyall, Early 
German Legal Anthropology: Albert Hermann Post and his Questionnaire, in Journal 
of African Law, vol. 52, 2008, p. 114 ss.  
64 Das Naturgesetz des Rechts. Einleitung in eine Philosophie des Rechts auf 
Grundlage der modernen empirischen Wissenschaft (1867); Einleitung in eine 
Naturwissenschaft des Rechts (1872). 
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the reality of law. Moreover, he also pointed out that the hypothesis of 
a general legal sense born with us was absurd. Moreover, he also 
criticized the historical school of law because this scholarly movement 
only dealt with the law of some people, thus they did not strive for a 
more general research, and, therefore, it only focused on written 
sources but neglected other types of them.65 Due to these manifest 
deficiencies, a completely new jurisprudence had to be established, 
whose preparation according to Post could largely be facilitated by 
the idea of empiricism and evolutionism, furthermore, the application 
of the comparative method has also play a role.  
In the creation of the methodology of this new jurisprudence, 
Post was largely inspired by three disciplines rapidly developing in the 
era: ethnology, biology and sociology. The universality and method of 
ethnology had a great effect on him because these two points could 
help overcome those imperfections of the natural and historical 
schools of law which were previously identified. The idea of evolution 
in biology – which preached the orderliness of development, was 
considered broadly accepted since Lamarck – could perfectly be 
integrated into a new, comprehensive account of legal development. 
Sociology, which had successfully applied the method of empirical 
research in examining societies, had undoubtedly provided the most 
important pattern for methodological renewal in jurisprudence.66 
So, Post’s perception of scholarship was explicitly shaped by the 
scientific development of his era, and its most important goal was to 
lay down the foundations of a new empirically-based theoretical 
jurisprudence. This new way of thinking would accept the thought of 
evolution as a starting point, and would examine as many legal 
systems around the world as possible. An interesting aspect of his 
evolutionism is that even though Darwin’s doctrine has largely 
influenced his attitude on legal development, Post never accepted the 
validity of fight for survival as the central thought of social-
                                                                                               
65 R.M. Kiesow, Science naturelle et droit dans la deuxieme moitié du XIXe 
siecle en Allemagne, in P. Amselek (ed.), Théorie du droit et science, Paris, 1994, p. 
193–194. 
66 Ibid., p. 200–203. 
         
 
Balázs Fekete 
Interpreting the History of Modern Comparative Law: Beyond Descriptive Linearity 
The Case of Historical-Comparative Jurisprudence 
 
ISSN 2532-6619 - 97 -    N. 2/2018 
Darwinism, while he supported the necessity of the unidirectional 
nature of evolutionary development.67 
Besides Darwin’s biological concept and the previously 
mentioned disciplines, Post’s views on legal development were also 
influenced by the evolutionary theory of Adolf Bastian, an important 
ethnographer of his era. According to Bastian, due to the homogeneity 
of human nature, development takes place in the same way and goes 
through the same steps everywhere in the world (Elementargedanke), 
however, some differences can be detected, which may be due to 
geographic, climatic or economic characteristics (Völkergedanke).68 It 
comes logically from this approach that primitive people show those 
early developmental levels, which have already been passed by the 
more civilized Western people. This insight is of great importance 
from the perspective of legal development, because the research of 
natural peoples makes it possible to get to know episodes of Western 
legal history, which could only be speculated about due to the lack of 
sources otherwise, argued Post.69 Thus, research always has to focus 
on the similarities of legal development dominated by evolution, and 
differences simply have to be disregarded according to him.70 
Post also examined the relation between legal philosophy and 
ethnology. In his view, ethnological research may point out that the 
phenomenon of law is inspired by a collective, and not individual, 
legal consciousness. The philosophical reason behind emphasizing 
collective legal consciousness might have been the fact that in relation 
to the general questions of consciousness Post has outright rejected 
Schopenhauer’s idealism, which separated world and consciousness 
and opposed them to each other. According to Post, the facts of the 
world surrounding us have a big impact on our consciousness,71 which 
cannot be disregarded in analysing legal consciousness either. He 
argued that our perceptions about law are shaped by social 
                                                                                               
67 Ibid., p. 208–209. 
68 P. Koschaker, L’historide de droit et le droit comparé sourtout en Allemagne, 
in Introduction á l’étude du droit comparé. Recueil d’Études en l’honneur d’Édouard 
Lambert, Paris, 1938, p. 276–277. 
69 A.H. Post, Ethnological Jurisprudence, in The Monist, vol. 2, 1891, p. 34. 
70 L.J. Constantinesco, op. cit., p. 121. 
71 R.M. Kiesow, op. cit., p. 195. 
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conditions, so if these conditions change, our legal consciousness is 
also transformed: some of the previous elements disappear and get 
replaced by new ones. Consequently, all legal philosophies, which 
build only on the given period’s legal consciousness, are unable to 
answer general – a strict sense – questions about law, so their scope is 
always limited.72 By recognizing this and together with the results of 
the empirical research of all the laws of the world, the ethnology must 
have a decisive role in laying the foundations of a new, general legal 
philosophy.73 Thus, in Post’s eyes, the results of ethnology may form 
the basis of a new, general legal philosophy. However, Post did not 
intend to develop this new legal philosophy in detail, this will be done 
by the key figure of this paradigm, Joseph Kohler, a decade later. 
In 1878, Franz Bernhöft and Georg Cohn have founded the 
already mentioned Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtwissenchaft, 
which had become the central forum of the German scholars sharing, 
at least partially, the previously detailed theoretical assumptions. The 
authors connected to the Zeitschrift have formed the German 
scientific community which approached legal problems in a new and 
original way, in a legal atmosphere which has mainly focused on 
dogmatics and textual interpretation. 
In his editorial, Bernhöft presented the main goals of 
comparative law (vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft) in his 
interpretation. He argued that this field of study, which was earlier 
called ethnological jurisprudence by Post, has to examine the 
evolvement of the institutions of peoples and the adequate 
development of the general laws of evolution.74 In accordance with 
Post’s already presented thoughts, Bernhöft stated that comparative 
law had to break up with its Roman- or German-centered nature 
when identifying and discussing the general laws of legal 
development.75 
Comparative law should significantly broaden the horizon of 
jurisprudence, whose only barrier is the fact that it has to refrain from 
studying the law of peoples living under a certain legal and moral 
                                                                                               
72 A.H. Post, op. cit., p. 37. 
73 Ibid., p. 40. 
74 L.J. Constantinesco, op. cit., p. 105. 
75 R. Schott, op. cit., p. 41. 
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level, because these issues belong to legal ethnology.76 Moreover, he 
differentiated between ethnology and comparative law, as he thought 
that those nations could not be studied where law was not 
objectivized yet, so it did not get separate from the sphere of ethics, 
which was a task for legal ethnology, again. When Joseph Kohler 
became the editor of Zeitschrift, this methodological differentiation 
elaborated by Bernhöft was given up, and this marked the beginning 
of examining the peoples who were regarded as being on the bottom 
of legal development. This ambition has led to a historically universal 
comparative jurisprudence, which has started to build a closer and 
closer relation to general philosophical efforts. 
 
 
4.2. Joseph Kohler’s general philosophy of law 
 
The major representative of the German school of historical and 
evolutionary comparative law, that is to say the first paradigm of 
comparative law, was Kohler, who besides his oeuvre in patent law, 
law of intellectual property, competition law, international law and 
legal philosophy, put a lot of energy in comparative law as well.77 As 
an author of the Zeitschrift, during his almost four-decade-long career, 
he wrote more than 300 publications belonging to the area of 
comparative law. His writings have covered most legal systems of 
historical and non-historical people, from Aztecan rights to the rights 
of Australian indigenous people.78 
The purpose of his theoretical writings was to create a 
comprehensive legal philosophy based on the comparative 
understanding of universal legal history of the world. In order to fulfil 
                                                                                               
76 This standpoint was developed by Bernhöft in his editorial introduction. F. 
Bernhöft, Über Zweck und Mittel der Vergleichenden Rechtswissenschaft, in 
Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft, vol. 1, 1878, p. 1 ss., as cited by L.J. 
Constantinesco, op. cit., p. 116–117. 
77 About Kohler’s attitude see R. Pound, Scope and Purpose of Sociological 
Jurisprudence, in Harvard Law Review, vol. 25, 1911/12, p. 158 ss.; R. Schott, op. cit., 
p. 41–44. The complete list of writings on Kohler can be found here: Archiv für 
Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 1921-22, p. 12–13. 
78 R. Schott, op. cit., p. 42. 
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this ambition, he has incorporated into his research both the laws of 
uncivilized peoples and civilized nations, because he argued that law 
is very much present in the ordinary life of less-developed people, 
even if in ways which differ from the modern manifestations of law. 
This point, based on the theory of evolution, considered the laws of 
uncivilized peoples to be equal to modern laws, and had changed the 
previous editorial principles of Zeitschrift as developed by Bernhöft, 
and also stepped over the borders of the period’s Europe-centric legal 
thinking.79 
Hegel had a huge impact on the formation of Kohler’s view of 
legal philosophy and philosophy in general. He was identified with the 
starting points of Hegelian philosophy to such an extent that Roscoe 
Pound considered him to be the leading figure of the so-called 
German new Hegelians,80 while other contemporaries gave him the 
title “Hegel revividus”.81 However, it is important to highlight that this 
Hegelian effect did not mean that Kohler accepted all components of 
Hegel’s theory without reservations. For instance, in relation to the 
development of history, he outright rejected Hegel’s dialectic view of 
thesis-antithesis-synthesis, because he was convinced that such a 
sterile, logical approach towards history cannot be justified. In this 
area, Kohler refined Hegel’s doctrines by accepting the thought of 
historical development, however he did not think that the line of 
development could be determined with logical accuracy because 
history consists of ad-hoc and irrational events as well, which makes 
the path of development uncertain always. For Kohler, human history 
was a complex phenomenon and this complexity justified the 
necessity of studying the historical phenomena in detail, instead of 
explaining them in an abstract, philosophical way.82 This eventual 
understanding of historical development, which is free from logical 
constraints, appears in Kohler’s views on legal evolution. 
                                                                                               
79 L.J. Constantinesco, op. cit., p. 113. 
80 R. Pound, op. cit., p. 154–158. 
81 Z. Péteri, A jogi kultúrák összehasonlításának előtörténetéhez, in Állam- és 
Jogtudomány, vol. 48, 2007, p. 515 ss. 
82 J Kohler, Philosophy of Law, Boston, 1914, p. 28–31 and 49. L.M. Elison, 
Kohler’s Philosophy of Law, in Journal of Public Law, vol. 10, 1961, p. 412–413.  
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However, the dominant Hegelian effect is also shown by the fact 
that Kohler never considered law to be an isolated entity, but he saw it 
as a phenomenon closely related to a given people’s own culture.83 
This centrality of culture, associated to his views on historical 
development, is the key to Kohler’s general legal theory. First of all, it 
follows from cultural context that the ways in which law appears in 
reality may differ both in space and time: so, law is a historically 
constantly changing phenomenon. On the other hand, the concept of 
culture may help in understanding the consistence of law as well, 
because this constant element in the historically everchanging concept 
of law is the purpose of law itself, which connects the historical 
manifestations of law. The main task of law according to Kohler is to 
help and support the creation of culture or the so-called cultural 
development, which aims at the most intense elaboration of human 
capabilities, and thus, at securing human rule over nature.84 Law can 
help in this process by creating a predictable system of relations, as 
opposed to the eventualities driving human relations, by regulating 
human relationships and maintaining order. According to Kohler, the 
insecurities of our lives can be tracked back to the often illogical 
factors of space, time, nature, chance, need and causality, and legal 
institutions are able to “tame” these factors due to their ability to 
maintain and preserve order, in other words, by making the world 
more predictable around us. This predictability, the precise 
organization of ad-hoc elements of life by regulation assures that law 
gets an important role in fulfilling the conditions of cultural 
development.85 
Thus, legal development is inseparable from the transformations 
of human culture, according to Kohler. In his view, in all cultures we 
can find “legal postulates” which define the content of the legal 
system. Law is not only changing in a historical sense, but it is also 
developing within a given culture, always in a way to measure up to 
                                                                                               
83 J. Kohler, Philosophy of Law 4. and 58–61. For discussion: Z. Péteri, A jogi 
kultúrák összehasonlításának előtörténetéhez, cit., p. 516–517. 
84 Kohler, Philosophy of Law 58. For discussion: Z. Péteri, A jogi kultúrák 
összehasonlításának előtörténetéhez, cit., p. 516–517. 
85 Cf. Kohler, Philosophy of Law 28–31. 
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the expectations of the culture.86 In Kohler’s words: “Thus every 
culture has its definite postulates of law, and it is the duty of society, 
from time to time, to shape the law according to these 
requirements.”87 Thus, a legal provision is not given in itself, but 
society always has to aim at recognizing the needs of law and shaping 
the actual rules accordingly. 
This leads us to Kohler’s critique against the legal theory of his 
era. In his view, legal theory, which neglected the cultural 
determination of law, could not yet pay enough attention to the 
sociological aspects of lawmaking, and therefore it simply overrated 
the role of the lawmaker in the process. It needs to be recognized that 
lawmakers are the “children” of their era, so the culture of the period 
affects them as much as it affects simple citizens. Consequently, law 
cannot be understood solely as the will of the lawmaker, but the 
certain rules should be examined in a sociological frame, in their 
cultural context.88 
In addition, Kohler considered law to be inseparable from 
human nature, so he considered the customs of the people in the 
beginning of their development to be law in the strict term of the 
word. He thought that “people cannot exist without law”, but there 
can be cultures which are not yet familiar with courts or where there is 
no organized state in the strict sense, but this does not mean that they 
do not have a law.89 Law, or the idea of order is coded in our human 
existence and cannot be separated from it, as it is stressed by Kohler. 
However, it has to be emphasized that a legal order always reaches its 
final picture due to the individual and community impulses which 
shape the given culture.90 Thus, law is a phenomenon which emerges 
as a totality of culturally determined, very complicated effects. Its 
                                                                                               
86 R. Pound, op. cit., p. 156–157. 
87 J. Kohler, Philosophy of Law, cit., p. 4. 
88 J Kohler, Lehrbuch des bürgerlichen Rechts, cit., p. 38. Cited by R. Pound, 
op. cit., p. 158. 
89 Kohler’s thought about this question are the following (translated by 
Schott): “Therefore there is no people without law: there are people without courts, 
there are people that lack a state organization [...] but [...] Man cannot be non-
Man”. R. Schott, op. cit., p. 43. 
90 See in detail: L.M. Elison, op. cit., p. 415–416.  
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development is influenced by many impulses, so it can only be 
examined based on the broadest studies, which cannot simply be 
imagined without applying the comparative method. 
Another important thesis of Kohler is that the genie of humanity 
opens up to the researchers through the specific genie of peoples, and 
this makes it possible to realize that the legal development of 
humanity is influenced by the same civilizational effects. Humanity 
has always been striving for law, Drang nacht Recht, since the first 
humans has appeared on Earth.91 Thus, the specificity of human spirit 
is the strive for progression, so legal development is also subdued to 
the law of progression.92 From the point of view of the evolutionist 
understanding of legal development, Kohler’s opinion stemming from 
the critique of the Hegelian thought of development was that it was 
not necessary for legal development to happen quite similarly in all 
civilizations, because only the goals are fixed, the tools achieving those 
goals may differ significantly. Consequently, the main methodological 
principle of comparative law is that it considers different national laws 
to be parts of the same human civilization, and it searches for their 
relation with the development of humanity.93 
Human civilization, which is united in its diversity, has and had 
different levels, and civilization itself is a developmental process from 
a lower towards a higher levels. Thus, for Kohler, the most severe 
mistake for a comparativist is to compare legal systems which are not 
on the same civilizational level, for example they compare the laws of 
a people which makes marriages through buying and selling women to 
a society which already stands at the level of religious marriage.94 
Besides this mistake, a comparativist also has to pay attention to 
                                                                                               
91 J. Kohler, De la méthode du droit compare, in Congrés international de droit 
comparé. Tenu á Paris du 31 Juillet au 4 aout 1900. Procés-verbaux et documents, 
Paris, 1905, p. 228. 
92 Ibid., p. 229. 
93 Ibid., p. 230. 
94 Ibid., p. 231. Pollock comes to the same conclusion when determining that 
only legal systems which are on the same civilisational level are worth comparing, 
taking into account their individual development. According to him, comparing 
Indian law and customs with modern English law would only lead to ridiculous and 
dangerous misunderstandings. F. Pollock, History of Comparative Jurisprudence, cit., 
p. 76. 
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always examine the substantive correlations, and through this 
differentiate the important elements in legal development for the 
secondary phenomena.95 The task of researchers is further hampered 
by the irregular path of legal development, which results in cases 
when a legal institution may not always appear in the same form in the 
case of a given people.96 
Kohler’s intellectual efforts integrated comparative law to the 
framework of general legal theory and created an individual 
understanding of jurisprudence as such. However, his philosophy-
oriented work was not continued after his death in 1918, because his 
successors, Leonhard Adam and Richard Thurnwald gradually gave 
up their previously universalist aims, and directed their attention only 
towards uncivilized peoples.97 Collaterally, the background of German 
legal ethnology has changed radically, too. Following World War 
One, the evolutionist thinking focusing on similarities which was 
created by Bastian and further developed by Post was discarded, and 
they turned towards the theory of cultural circles (Kulturkreise), 
which emphasized the uniqueness of historical development. 
According to this approach, every civilization is a unique historical 
phenomenon which develops individually and independently. 98 
Moreover, legal development can be divided into typical and atypical 
elements, but the typical elements are not submitted to natural laws, 
so their significance can only be relative. These arguments 
fundamentally break up with the former paradigm-creating 
presumptions and mark the separation of German legal ethnology 
from comparative law.99 
 
 
5. The first paradigm of modern comparative law: a summary 
 
One may convincingly argue based on the earlier discussion that 
the first paradigm of modern comparative law gradually emerged in 
                                                                                               
95 J. Kohler, De la méthode du droit comparé, cit., p. 231. 
96 Ibid. 
97 R. Schott, op. cit., p. 47–52. 
98 P. Koschaker, op. cit., p. 277. 
99 Ibid., p. 280. 
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the second half of the 19th century and improved along its structural 
presumptions. Therefore, one may also point out that this process of 
four decades intellectual development meets two crucial points of 
Kuhn’s philosophy on paradigms. First of all, as compared the earlier 
attempts to use comparative method in legal scholarship – mostly 
fragmentary and individual initiatives100 – during the first half of the 
19th, the methodological coherence of these English and German 
scholarly works, including their conceptual bases and working 
premises (generalizations in Kuhnian terms), is striking. Therefore, 
the 1860s can definitely be regarded as the end of the pre-paradigm 
period and the birth of the first paradigm in modern comparative law; 
that is to say, the idea of ‘normal science’101 came up in comparative 
law thinking in these years. Secondly, it is also apparent, that the work 
of these, either, German or English scholars mostly equals to what is 
called by Kuhn as puzzle-solving scientific activity.102 As for both, 
methodological and substantive questions, the discourse on legal 
evolution and its details is to be regarded as product of mutual 
discussion and reflections. 
It is also remarkable to what extent this ‘normal’ academic 
activity was based on the same scholarly premises shared by members 
of the comparative law academic community, at that time mostly 
scholars of the English- and German-speaking world. Obviously, this 
would have been impossible without the first wave of 
institutionalization, the birth of a network composed of journals, 
academic associations and university departments. The ‘institutions’ 
provided wide opportunity to get to know each other’s work and to 
reflect on them. Even though, obviously, there were relevant 
differences in the works of the English and German authors due to 
personal and cultural reasons, they all started from the same set of 
presumptions (again, symbolical generalizations), although their 
                                                                                               
100 Leibniz, Montesquieu, Vico, Gans or Lerminier are to be regarded as 
major actors of this ‘pre-paradigm’ period. They tried to apply comparative methods 
in studying several aspect of law, however did so by relying on diverse 
methodological principles and their efforts had no community character. For a 
detailed discussion see: L.J. Constantinesco, op. cit., p. 50 ss. 
101 Cf. T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, cit., p. 23 ss. 
102 Ibid., p. 35 ss. 
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emphases may have differed obviously. For example, German authors 
most often strove for identifying and understanding general 
tendencies,103 while the English interest in legal comparison was partly 
dominated by its focus on particularities and aimed at examining 
unique phenomena as a staring step.104 
In the center of these presumptions stood the insight that legal 
development, similarly to the previous biological understanding of 
evolution, is ruled by laws and these laws can be discovered through a 
devoted scholarly work. Each scholar in the paradigm attempted to 
reveal these universal laws determining legal development and the 
consecutive stages of legal evolution. They intended to carry out this 
research plan by examining legal development with an empirical 
interest – in this context this term meant the opposition to pure 
deduction and fictions, a robust attention to the facts of legal history – 
and by comparing the legal systems of different periods and peoples. 
The step-by-step examination of legal evolution was especially 
relevant because one of the major hypotheses of the paradigm stated 
that legal development goes through the same path, so by studying the 
legal systems of ‘uncivilized’ peoples such early periods of the legal 
history of ‘civilized’ nations can be met that were previously not 
recorded in written sources. 
That is, a paradigm-creating community dominantly composed 
of English and German legal scholars emerges in front of our eyes. 
The were not able to fundamentally change the dominant, basically 
legal-positivist and dogmatic legal scholarship of the period, but they 
still created a framework and achieved such results, that it can be 
argued that they created the first paradigm of comparative law laying 
on stable methodological premises and research goals. The maturity of 
the paradigm is proved by the simple fact that when the paradigm-
                                                                                               
103 Cf. R. Schott, op. cit., p. 38. 
104 According to Vinogradoff: “The necessity for revising the comparative 
method is one of the lines on which modern jurisprudence has to take up the thread 
of investigation. Inferences must be preceeded by a careful study of individual cases, 
and in this study juridical analysis ought to receive more attention than has been the 
case hitherto. This side is very poorly represented in the books of anthropological 
jurisprudence Sir P. Vinogradoff, Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence I, London, 
1920-22, p. 149. 
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shift occurred in the first decades of the 20th century, the 
representatives of the new thinking set forth their starting points in 
relation to or in opposition to these presumptions.105 
In sum, in the 19th century English and German scholars played 
the leading role in the development of modern comparative law 
thinking and the formation of the first real paradigm, while French 
legal scholarship did not participate with such intensity in creating 
this paradigm. However, the Parisian International Congress of 
Comparative Law held in 1900, will not only swiftly change the general 
understanding of comparative law by triggering the first paradigm-
shift in the history of comparative law, but the geographical focus of 
comparative law studies in Europe will also be altered as France will 
become the centre of this new paradigm (droit comparé). Édouard 
Lambert and Raymond Saleilles will set forth such new insights on the 
nature and goals of comparative law that will be totally incompatible – 
that is to say: incommensurable – with the earlier, well-developed 
premises.106 
 
 
Abstract: This paper aims at revising some parts of the history of 
modern comparative law. In essence, it argues that paradigms can be 
identified in this story, and it justifies this point by reconstructing the 
first paradigm of modern comparative law. By applying some concepts 
of Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science – pre-paradigm period, 
scientific community, paradigm, and symbolical generalizations – it 
argues that the first paradigm of modern comparative law was born in 
1860-80s. This paradigm – called as either comparative jurisprudence 
or Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft – was inspired by positivism and 
                                                                                               
105 Lambert, for instance, differentiates between the goals of the historical 
school and the new thinking. See E. Lambert, op. cit., p. 32., Rabel, within the 
framework of systemic-dogmatic comparative law, sets fundamentally different goals 
for comparative law than the previous ones. M. Rheinstein, op. cit., p. 246–247. 
106 As for instance, Lambert advocated a new concept of comparative law 
being different from the ideas of Maine, Bernhöft or Kohler. In his eyes, 
comparative law must be focused on contemporary continental systems of private 
law – especially those of with Latin and German roots – and try to identify the 
common points of these laws (droit commun législatif). See E. Lambert, op. cit. 
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the idea of evolution. A main premise of this paradigm was that legal 
development, similarly to the biological understanding of evolution, is 
ruled by laws and these laws can be discovered through a devoted 
scholarly work. Each scholar in the paradigm, either English or 
German, attempted to reveal these universal laws determining legal 
development and the consecutive stages of legal evolution. 
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